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Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management 
 
Randal C. Picker* 
 
Consider this hypothetical: 
You buy a music CD and pop it into your computer. Before you can rip the CD 
to your computer, a registration window opens. That window takes your name 
and credit card information. Once registered, you can rip the CD and play the 
music to your heart’s content. You can add the songs to your central media 
servers at home or put the songs on your iPod and the iPod of each member of 
your family. You can do a mash-up if you want: take the first 20 seconds of 
each song and make a new one. And if you want to upload the CD to a peer-to-
peer network, go ahead. 
 
What’s the catch? The catch is that your identity travels with the songs—more pre-
cisely, not your full identity but an ID tag that can be matched with your stored account 
information—and someone in possession of the tag can access part of your account, can, 
say, turn in the tag and get $10 charged to the account holder’s credit card. Think of this 
as identity-based digital rights management (DRM) with incentives or—more sharply—
mistrust-based DRM. How would this approach differ from current DRM schemes and 
why might this one have a better chance of succeeding? 
As I explain below, it would be difficult to implement this sort of scheme for standard 
music CDs or DVDs. But just as the VCR has gone the way of the dodo, physical media 
are dying as mechanisms for delivering content. Edison’s wax cylinders have had a great 
run, but online distribution of content will supplant physical media in the next decade. 
We are replacing products with services. 
                                                 
* Copyright © 2006, Randal C. Picker. All Rights Reserved. Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial 
Law, The University of Chicago Law School and Senior Fellow, The Computation Institute of the University of Chi-
cago and Argonne National Laboratory. I thank my fellow panelists at the Digital Broadband Migration Conference, 
February 19-20, 2006 at Silicon Flatirons at the University of Colorado School of Law for comments, as well as par-
ticipants in the April 7, 2006 UCLA School of Law Media, Entertainment and Culture Workshop, plus Ed Felten and 
also thank the Russell Baker Scholars Fund and the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, and through the 
Olin Program, Microsoft Corporation, Verizon, and Visa U.S.A., Inc., for generous research support. I posted a short-
version of this on the University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog (available at  
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/02/adding_mistrust.html) and benefited from the ensuing comments 
and online discussion. 
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The scheme I describe above is precisely the one that is being implemented in online 
distribution today, at least in part. This is still at an early stage, but Apple’s iTunes, 
Google’s new video service and Amazon’s coming Amazon Upgrade give us a sense of 
how online DRM will be implemented, not as a kludgy add-on as is being done for music 
CDs, but as part of the original design. Mistrust-based DRM will be a key part of this, 
precisely because of the way that it leverages the content purchaser’s incentives to pro-
tect identity and, in so doing, protect content. 
DRM is both important and controversial. From the copyright holder’s perspective, 
DRM is first and foremost about making meaningful the legal rights assigned to the 
copyright holder under copyright law, especially the right to control the making of cop-
ies.1 The right to control copying of a work isn’t self executing. Copying has been con-
trolled through the technology of copying, where until the last thirty years or so, copying 
was expensive and asymmetric. By expensive, I mean that it was relatively difficult to 
make the second copy of a work. By asymmetric, I mean that the it was typically substan-
tially cheaper to make the second copy as part of making a unified run of copies of the 
work than it was for a third-party to make a second copy from a first physical copy of the 
work. 
This has changed over the last thirty years. With the rise of the cassette tape recorder, 
photocopying equipment, the VCR and more recently of peer-to-peer networks, copying 
costs have dropped and third-parties are as well-situated as the copyright holder to make 
additional copies. Copying costs have become symmetric, and technology, once the bar-
rier to copying, has become the means of copying. Legal rights enforced through techno-
logical barriers are much harder to enforce, at least not without new technological barri-
ers, hence the rise of digital rights management. The promise is meaningful enforcement 
of the rights that exist on the statute books, the fear is a shift in control in favor of copy-
right holders and away from the public, perhaps through limits on fair use of works. 
                                                 
1 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (“Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclu-
sive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted works in copies or phonore-
cords; ....”); Article 2 of the European Union Copyright Directive (“Member States shall provide for the exclusive right 
to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in 
whole or in part: (a) for authors, of their works; ... .”), Directive 2001/29/EC, May 22, 2001. 
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With add-on DRM of the sort we have seen for music CDs, the CD owner and a dedi-
cated decryptor have a shared interest in evading use restrictions, so the CD owner is ea-
ger to enlist the help of the decryptor and has little concern about the wide spread over 
the network of the music on the CDs. And one p2p user has little to fear from a fellow 
user of the network. In contrast, with identity-based DRM—when a valuable ID tag trav-
els with the content (or with access to the content)—we will drive an incentives wedge 
between the CD owner and the decryptor and between members of the p2p network. The 
CD owner will fear that in removing the use restrictions, the decryptor will acquire the 
account information and that that information could be put to ill use or that the content 
will seep out into the p2p network still bearing the ID tag. 
The darknet critique of DRM says that it only takes one: just one person to get around 
the DRM and put the content out into the clear free of the wrapper.2 Mistrust-based DRM 
embraces that idea: if it only takes one person to claim the bounty ID tag, the content 
owner may choose not to share the content. The interesting, almost sociological, question 
is how much suspicion do you need to introduce into a file-sharing system for content 
owners to refuse to share with anonymous recipients over peer-to-peer networks? And if 
the small-worlds phenomenon tells us that we are just six links from everyone else on the 
planet, how many of my friends will I trust with access to my account, given that they 
may give it to their friends, who may gave it to their friends, etc.? Small-group sharing 
plus six degrees of separation equals sharing with the entire world, and, unfortunately, 
not everyone in the world can be trusted. 
I should be more precise about the mechanics of implementing identity-based DRM. 
The core notion is that an identification tag is attached to each song, presumably at the 
point of downloading. Given concerns about privacy, it is highly unlikely that this tag 
would be transparent, that is, that it would be readable by any recipient. An encrypted tag 
but one that uniquely identifies the original recipient of the content suffices. 
We should build this system up one brick at a time. With ID tags embedded in songs, 
the download service could scour p2p networks for tagged content and could implement a 
                                                 
2 Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, and Bryan Willman, The Darknet and the Future of Content Dis-
tribution; Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the DMCA Against the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Techno-
logical Protection Measures, 24 Loyola Entertainment Law Rev. 635 (2004). 
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penalty when tagged content was found. Very little limits that penalty structure. The 
download service could revoke the right to use that service and could couple that with a 
monetary fine. 
This is ID tagging plus centralized enforcement. We could decentralize enforcement 
and that would probably require some sort of bounty system to induce users of p2p net-
works to turn in songs to collect the bounty. Note that this does not mean that identity 
needs to be transparent; all that is required is that the—you choose: 
snitch/tattletale/whistleblower—has knowledge of the existence of the tag and seeks to 
collect the bounty by turning in a tagged song. 
Identity tags plus bounties gets us to mistrust-based DRM. We need decentralization 
of enforcement to create mistrust and to break the alignment of incentives that otherwise 
exists in p2p systems. Mistrust enters at two points, as to both software (code) and peers. 
If shared songs carry with them valuable ID tags, you will be willing to shared tagged 
songs only with trustworthy peers. You almost certainly will not want to share those 
songs with anonymous users of p2p networks. The second possible point of mistrust is 
the software that gets songs from your PC to the p2p network. There have often been 
alignment issues with this software, perhaps most notoriously with KaZaa. The existence 
of valuable ID tags takes this another step, as the tags may create the fear that the soft-
ware itself will try to access the value embedded in the tags.3 
Section I of the paper looks at the most recent conflict over DRM, namely, Sony 
BMG’s distribution of copy-protected music CDs. It would be a mistake for us to gener-
alize from the real difficulties associated with adding DRM to a preexisting product. The 
world of online content services is fundamentally different. Section II addresses four 
ways in which DRM is currently used, namely, copy-control; per-use pricing; closed-
system definition and patent-royalty collection; and competition structuring. In Section 
III, I discuss Google Video, Amazon Upgrade, and Apple’s iTunes. These are three lead-
ing examples of services that are embracing, at least in part, identity-based DRM. 
                                                 
3 Whether this system can be implemented is in dispute. For critical commentary, see Ed Felten, Mistrust-Based 
DRM, February 22, 2006 (available at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=980); Ed Felten, How Watermarks Fail, 
February 24, 2006 (available at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=981). 
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I. The Problem of the CD: Sony BMG and Add-On DRM 
The producers of music CDs fear that they have entered a SOFE world: sold once, free 
everywhere. If a person can buy a CD, rip it and upload it to a peer-to-peer network, the 
copyright holder may only sell one copy of a CD. Of course, that isn’t the real world, but 
it is close enough to understand the urge to add digital rights management to music CDs. 
But we run into a disabling problem immediately: music CDs need to play in CD 
players. For decades, CDs have played in CD players and a new CD needs to be able to 
do that as well. So somehow an ordinary CD player needs to play the CD flawlessly, yet 
when that same CD is inserted into the CD drive built into your computer, it needs to 
work differently. Otherwise if the computer is given unfettered access to the music, it’s 
rip, upload, and off to the p2p networks. 
This is a real problem: make sure that the product can be used in its traditional, stan-
dard uses and yet limit new uses. That isn’t a statement about the merits of that approach, 
just the difficulties of implementing it. It is as if the CD needs to play in the CD player 
and yet somehow be prevented from being inserted into a toaster when the purchaser 
really wants to pop it in. 
A. Staring at the Jewel Box: Neil Diamond’s 12 Songs. 
Enter Sony BMG and two different encryption schemes, XCP and MediaMax. Sony 
BMG has released a number of music CDs using the two schemes.4 To take one example, 
Neil Diamond’s 12 Songs is encrypted with the XCP copy protection scheme. A careful 
examination of the front spine of the CD reveals a logo coupled with the phrase 
“CONTENT PROTECTED” and, beneath that, in small letters, a suggestion to see the 
reverse side for what are optimistically-described as “features.” 
On the back, along with the usual list of songs, near the bottom, we see blocks of in-
formation relating to copyright. That includes the FBI anti-piracy warning symbol;5 a 
statement that “unauthorized copying is punishable under federal law;” and a “compati-
ble with” block. The latter addresses playback, ripping, and the use of portable devices. 
                                                 
4  A list of relevant CDs can be found at http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/CDList.htm. 
5 See the FBI Press Release of February 19, 2004 for details (available at  
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The block indicates that limited copies are possible; that the website 
cp.sonybmg.com/xcp should be consulted for additional information; and a footnote indi-
cating that “certain computers may not be able to access the digital file portion of this 
desk. Use subject to applicable end user license agreement.” 
And, were that not enough, all of that is followed with yet smaller print indicating a 
variety of copyrights, trademarks, and a final statement: “WARNING. All Rights Re-
served. Unauthorized duplication is a violation of applicable laws.” A music CD that 
only a lawyer could love. Some of what appears on 12 Songs is completely generic, such 
as the FBI anti-piracy warning and the indication of copyright and restrictions on dupli-
cation. It is the detailed copyright-control information that is distinctive. 
If the negative publicity over Sony BMG’s DRM has not scared you off, you remove 
the shrinkwrap. The CD itself is stamped with the FBI anti-piracy warning logo and the 
FBI anti-piracy warning itself along with further indications of copyright and trademarks. 
We learn—for I did not know it before opening the CD—that the logo on the spine of the 
CD is the “copy control logo,” which is a trademark of IFPI and used under license on 
the CD.6 
The CD liner contains pictures of Neil Diamond making music; a brief amount of 
text; and the usual production information. We are told once again about copyrights and 
trademarks, and a final warning about reserved rights and unlawful duplication. The only 
new copyright item of interest is that all of the songs—words and music by Neil Dia-
mond—are published by DiamondSongs and are available through SESAC, rather than 
ASCAP or BMI. The liner tells us nothing about the copy-control scheme. 
What happens next? That depends on what you do with the CD. If you insert the CD 
into a standard CD player—say a Sony Walkman or a CD player in your car—the music 
plays, just like it has since Thomas Edison built his phonograph. That almost comes as a 
surprise: you half expect the CD to start smoking and self-destruct, just like in Mission 
Impossible, but, nope, it plays music. Diamond describes the music as “a stripped-down 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/feb04/pirates021904.htm).  
6 IFPI is the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry; see www.ifpi.org for more information. IFPI 
launched the copy control logo on September 17, 2002. See the press release at http://www.ifpi.org/site-
content/press/20020917.html. 
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acoustic sound.” That seems right; the orchestration is notable for its spareness and sim-
plicity. The complicated part of the CD isn’t the music, it’s the copy-control scheme. 
But a CD player is a relatively locked-down device. Not fully so, as there needs to be 
a port for headphones to get the music out to our ears, and you can instead use that port to 
hook the music up to your computer to record—or at least so my 16-year old son tells 
me—so we can expect leakage even from CD players. But the target of the XCP encryp-
tion scheme isn’t the CD player and its port for headphones but instead your personal 
computer. 
B. Inside XCP and MediaMax 
Typically, when I purchase a CD, I immediately rip it using the Windows Media Player 
(WMP). Just to get the mechanics right, I will first open WMP and then will insert the 
CD into my computer. With an unencrypted CD, I select the rip tab in WMP and the mu-
sic is then stored on my computer. The current version of WMP allows me to determine 
whether or not the copy on my computer is subject to a copy protection scheme imple-
mented by the WMP itself. 
What happens instead if I insert a CD copy-protected by either XCP or MediaMax? I 
have not done that but Ed Felten, a computer scientist at Princeton, and his graduate stu-
dent Alex Halderman have done so and have reported the results, initially on the Free-
dom to Tinker blog and subsequently in an academic paper.7 There are lots of details, but 
I will lay out a simple version. 
XCP and MediaMax are what Felton and Halderman have termed active protection 
systems. Both copy-protection schemes take advantage of the autorun feature built into 
the Windows operating system.8 The point of autorun is to simplify installation of new 
software. Absent autorun, the consumer needs to figure out what program should be 
started from any CD to install new software. Autorun takes that process out of the con-
                                                 
7 The blog is at www.freedom-to-tinker.com. For the paper, see J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons 
from the Sony CD DRM Episode (working paper, Feb. 14, 2006) (available at  
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf).  
8 For a more detailed explanation, see http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;818804.  
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sumer’s hands and reduces the possibility that a consumer won’t understand how to in-
stall new software. 
With autorun on, the insertion of a copy-protected CD causes software embedded on 
the CD to be invoked. The precise details are different for XCP and MediaMax, and those 
differences might matter, but not for my purposes here. The key idea is that the automati-
cally-invoked software can block normal copying of the CD and can impose an end-user 
license agreement that limits access by the computer to the CD.9 
To make all of this work, autorun installs software on the user’s computer, and, then 
takes the additional step of installing additional software to hide the newly-installed 
DRM software.10 I am not sure how to describe this behavior, but as Felten and Halder-
man make clear, uninvited installation coupled with cloaking is exactly the behavior that 
we expect and fear from spyware and other forms of malware, and in particular, a class of 
malware known as “rootkits.”11 These are programs that hide on PCs and allow outsiders 
to exercise some control over the machines (frequently making the machines zombie PCs 
and creating a parade of harms to the network).12 
So Sony BMG installs software and then hides the software to make it more difficult 
for consumers to remove it. Sony BMG discloses the existence of the software in the 
EULA, but if you didn’t read that carefully, you might not notice that software was being 
installed. And the EULA says very little about how the software is installed, making it 
quite hard for consumers to remove the now-hidden software later. Of course, that is the 
point. If the DRM software is actually going to control access to content, the software 
needs to be there. It can’t be the case that the consumer can remove the software at will, 
                                                 
9 For discussion, see J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System (Version 1.1, 
October 6, 2003) (available at www.cs.princeton.edu/~jhalderm/cd3/); J. Alex Halderman, CD DRM Makes Com-
puters Less Secure, November 1, 2005 (available at www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=919). 
10 See id. 
11 Ed Felten, SongBMG “Protection” is Spyware, November 10, 2005 (available at www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=923); J. Alex Halderman, MediaMax Permanently Installs and Runs Unwanted Software Even if User 
Declines EULA, November 28, 2005 (available at www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=936). For general discussion, see 
Greg Hoglund & James Butler, Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel 4 (Addison-Wesley, 2006) (“In other words, 
a rootkit is a set of programs and code that allows a permanent or consistent, undetectable presence on a computer” 
(emphasis removed).) 
12 For discussion, see Randal C. Picker, Cybersecurity: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky, in The Law and Econom-
ics of Cybersecurity (Ed. Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi, Cambridge Press, 2006). 
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at least if doing so won’t also end the right to access the associated content sitting on the 
computer. 
But the particular cloaking approach used by Sony BMG also made it possible for 
outsiders to hide their software in the same cloaked area of the consumer’s computer. Of 
course, a malware author might very well bundle his own cloaking device with the mal-
ware, and, indeed, this is a standard complaint about rootkits.13 The real question is 
whether the existence of the Sony BMG cloak made it possible for a malware author to 
hide his malware when he couldn’t have done so on his own. Whatever mechanism is 
used to bring in the malware in the first place should also be available to install the mal-
ware cloak, though part of this depends on exactly what level of access—administrator, 
user or something else—that the user makes available, intentionally or not, to the in-
truder. And the fact that we actually observed a malware author taking advantage of the 
Sony BMG cloak tells us very little. My guess is that malware authors are high on the list 
of DRM haters, so we could readily predict that the Sony BMG cloak would be ex-
ploited. What we can’t know is whether the malware was simply written to make Sony 
BMG look bad or whether absent the Sony BMG cloak the malware author would have 
written his own cloak. 
Felten and Halderman make clear that a savvy computer user will be able to avoid the 
XCP and MediaMax encryption schemes.14 Turning off autorun means that the user af-
firmatively has to invoke the software, and the consumer has no incentive to do so. In-
deed many computer security experts recommend turning off autorun as the insertion of 
the CD can otherwise have unexpected consequences. 
C. Four Problems for Add-On DRM 
We should take stock of the situation faced by content producers such as Sony BMG. 
First, the analysis by Felten and Halderman make clear that add-on DRM is likely to be 
ineffective. Smart consumers will sidestep the DRM limitations by turning off autorun 
                                                 
13 See J. Alex Halderman, CD DRM Makes Computers Less Secure, November 1, 2005 (available at 
www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=919). 
14 Ed Felten, What Does MediaMax Accomplish?, November 23, 2005 (available at www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=935). 
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and that will give them access to the standard audio files that are on the CDs. From there 
it is just a hop, skip and a jump to wide distribution on peer-to-peer networks. 
Second, add-on DRM faces stiff consumer resistance. I first encountered 12 Songs in 
my native capacity as consumer. Amazon did a good job of emphasizing that the CD was 
copy-protected and I quickly clicked elsewhere. Some consumers have attempted to or-
ganize boycotts of companies that sell copy-protected CDs. I suspect that none of this is 
lost on content sellers and that influences how much—or how little—they emphasize that 
the CDs are copy-protected. My detailed description of 12 Songs was meant to highlight 
that it would be easy for a consumer to miss the copy protection. Yes, there was a lot 
there, but much of it is in small print; if you weren’t looking for it as I was, it might be 
easy to skip right over it. And the appearance of an End-User License Agreement might 
not be enough either, as for better or worse, consumers routinely click through these 
agreements. 
Third, add-on DRM will need to navigate a thicket of federal and state laws. The 
class-action lawsuit filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation allege claims under the 
California Consumer Legal Remedies Act; for unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business 
practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200; for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and for false or misleading 
statements under California Business and Professions Code 17500.15 
State Attorney General’s in Massachusetts and New York launched investigations out 
of Sony BMG sales, and the Texas Attorney General brought suit under the Texas Con-
sumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act of 2005, a new law which became ef-
fective on September 1, 2005.16 And blog commentary has raised questions about the ap-
plicability of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which criminalizes under cer-
tain conditions unauthorized access of a computer.17 
                                                 
15 Background on the case, including the complaint, is available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/Sony-BMG/. 
16 Arik Hesseldahl, Spitzer Gets on Sony BMG’s Case, BusinessWeek online, Nov. 29, 2005 (available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2005/tc20051128_573560.htm); Press Release of November 30, 
2005, Recalled Sony BMG CDs with Potential Risk to Computer Viruses Are Still Available in Boston (available at 
http://www.ago.state.ma.us/sp.cfm?pageid=986&id=1540); Press Release of November 21, 2005, Attorney General 
Abbott Brings First Enforcement Action In Nation Against Sony Bmg for Spyware Violations (available at 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagNews/release.php?id=1266). 
17 18 U.S.C. § 1030. For commentary, see Ed Felten, Sony CDs and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Decem-
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The point here is not to address the legal sufficiency of these claims. For example, I 
think that we will be cautious in taking the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act into these 
situations. That act focuses on outside break-ins, rather than those who proceed under 
permission of the sort set forth in Sony BMG’s XCP End-User License Agreement 
(“EULA”). We will not quickly move from possible contract violations—and indeed I am 
not sure that there are any of those here—to criminal liability.18 That does mean, as Fel-
ten has pointed out, that installing software without a contract in place will pose greater 
risks, as Felten and Halderman suggest occurs with MediaMax DRM. Instead, the point 
is to note that a business strategy that engenders multiple class actions and investigations 
and lawsuits by state Attorney General’s is likely to be short-lived. 
Fourth, I should also say that while I do not expect us to jump from contract quickly 
from contract to criminal violations, I also think that in the longer-run, we will probably 
not allow content providers to simply enforce one-sided EULAs. We face a basic conflict 
over control: computer owners want to control their PCs, content sellers want to control 
what happens to their content.19 I don’t think that there are many absolutes in this argu-
ment. The fact that I paid for my laptop doesn’t mean that I can’t agree with Sony BMG 
or some other content provider that there are limits on what I can do with my computer, 
limitations that I might want to agree to to get access to content. And content owners start 
with terms set by copyright. Some of those terms clearly benefit copyright holders, but 
others, such as fair use and the first-sale doctrine, benefit content users. 
These contracts—whether written on paper or implemented through agreement and 
technological limits—sit out there as part of the legal landscape. Computer users should 
be able to cede control over their machines if they choose to do so. We see this frequently 
with software that updates itself remotely, such as Google Desktop Search or as Sony 
BMG contemplated would occur.20 And it is far from clear to me that consumers can’t 
waive fair use rights under the Copyright Act. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ber 21, 2005 (available at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=9490; Eric Goldman, Is Sony’s DRM Spyware, No-
vember 7, 2005 (available at http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/11/is_sonys_drm_sp.htm). 
18 See SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., Inc., 387 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
19 See John Borland, Who has the right to control your PC?, cnet new.com, November 21, 2005; Bruce Sterling, 
The Rootkit of All Evil, Wired Magazine, Febuary, 2006, p.94. 
20 On Google Desktop Search, see Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home and 
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We are entering an era in which consumer commitments about how they will receive, 
manage and use content will matter. Content owners want to know that content is enter-
ing a protected environment, meaning an environment which may control use, copying 
and distribution of copyrighted works. If consumers can’t make meaningful commit-
ments, content providers won’t be able to make meaningful distinctions between con-
sumers. 
That said, whatever one concludes about the angels-dancing-on-the-head-of-pins 
question about the limits of contract, my guess is that click-through agreements imple-
menting unreasonable rules regarding third-party access to consumer computers will not 
be sustainable politically, either before juries or in Congress. If that is right, contract 
won’t be the main device by which we will validate DRM, but we instead may require 
additional legislation with accompanying safe harbors, where some will favor strong pro-
tections for consumers—possibly as to uses and probably as to privacy—and others will 
favor content producers. 
*** 
If you sell music CDs, this is a bleak story. Add-on DRM hasn’t worked, isn’t wanted 
by consumers, and leads to lawsuits. In settling the EFF lawsuit, Sony BMG has agreed 
to stop selling music CDs with MediaMax or XCP.21 Given the reaction so far, Sony 
BMG almost must be delighted that it is now legally barred from doing something that it 
should no longer want to do anyhow. 
II. Why Digital Rights Management? 
We should back up and consider what digital rights management is seeking to accom-
plish. Four roles come to mind: (1) copy control to avoid SOFE (sold once, free every-
where); (2) per-use pricing, making possible greater pricing granularity, so as to charge 
consumers different prices for different uses of the same work; (3) patent-royalty collec-
tion across devices and media; and (4) competition structuring, so as to control how 
competition evolves with linked devices and content. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 Case Western L. Rev. 749 (2005); see Article 8 of the Sony BMG end user license 
agreement (“The SONY BMG PARTIES may from time to time provide you with updates of the SOFTWARE in a 
manner that the SONY BMG PARTIES deem to be appropriate”). 
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A. Copy-Control DRM 
So far, I have been talking about copy control. XCP and MediaMax seem to be classic 
copy-control DRM. For example, Sony BMG wasn’t trying to charge more for consum-
ers who wanted to use the CDs in a standard CD player and on a computer. So the con-
tent creator is perfectly happy to have the actual purchaser use the content in any time 
place and manner that the purchaser so desires, but the producer of the content once to 
prevent the purchaser from making copies to give the friends or to upload to peer-to-peer 
networks. 
Whether this stands any chance of working is contested. Playing a song so that I can 
hear it—I am listening to Chick Corea as I type—means that I can record it and the DRM 
scheme may not survive the recording process. The quality of that copy may be degraded, 
but it may be good enough. And a professional decryptor—is that the right phrase to use 
instead of hacker?—might strip away the DRM, and put an unencrypted copy onto a 
peer-to-peer network. Both of these possibilities work against effective DRM designed to 
control copies. 
With music CDs, we are trying to retrofit DRM on an existing platform. The analysis 
in Section I should make clear the enormous difficulties associated with this sort of add-
on DRM. But we won’t be doing too much retrofitting going forward. As discussed be-
low, DVDs came with encryption and the battle over the broadcast flag for digital televi-
sion (and high-definition radio, too) is precisely about whether these new formats will 
come with built-in copy and use controls. For digital television and radio, these are public 
battles, where we will fight about the scope of the authority given—or to be given—to 
the Federal Communications Commission and about the virtues and vices of government 
technology mandages. In contrast, the private online content services to be discussed in 
Section III—Google Video, Apple’s iTunes and Amazon Upgrade—will implement 
DRM without any need to consult with the FCC and will do so by choice and in competi-
tion with others and as part of the DNA of the platform. 
But the success or failure of copy-control DRM is not just about retrofitting of the 
sort that we have seen with music CDs. The core need to have the content in the clear, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 Detailed information about the settlement is available at http://www.sonybmgcdtechsettlement.com/. 
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it were, for the standard non-computer CD players creates the problems we saw in the 
XCP and MediaMax episode. But there is a more basic problem with locked-down DRM: 
the content purchaser and the professional decryptor have a shared interest in evading the 
copy control. That will be true even if the copy control is built in originally. Unless the 
copy-control is identity-based, we won’t give the content purchaser a reason to stay away 
from professional decryptors and their tools. That means that there is good reason to 
think that the broadcast flag regime is likely to struggle too. 
B. Bundled Uses and Per-Use Pricing 
I buy a DVD. Most users play DVDs on their home DVD players, but I want to watch my 
DVDs on my video iPod. The copyright holder wants to charge me extra for my non-
standard use and uses DRM to restrict my ability to move the DVDs to the iPod. DRM 
might facilitate per-use charging, as might take place if the DVD producer assessed a fee 
to unlock the DVD content for the iPod. 
I don’t want to try to assess the virtues and vices here of per-use pricing. I think that 
this is tricky. Absent DRM, using the DVD on the video iPod comes bundled with the 
DVD itself. That means that each DVD purchaser has to buy the entire bundle—the stan-
dard DVD player use and the video iPod use—even when she might just want to buy the 
standard use. The bundled uses might come at a higher price than the standard use. 
The only point to note here is how per-use pricing DRM influences the willingness of 
the content purchaser to try to crack the DRM scheme. Restrictions on use—as opposed 
to restrictions on sharing—will push the content purchaser towards figuring out how to 
evade the DRM scheme. The core theme of this paper is that we want to try to separate 
content purchasers from professional DRM evaders. Encoding identity into content will 
help do that, but restricting use will create more reasons to put identity at risk so as to 
circumvent use restrictions. 
Picker Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management 15 
 
C. Patent-Royalty Collection 
DVDs are encrypted with the content scramble system (CSS).22 Encryption has the con-
sequence of linking together in a closed system DVD disks and DVD players. Absent 
hacking, a DVD disk will play only on an authorized player. And the fact that licenses 
are required for the right to use CSS means that other controls can be implemented con-
sistently across the DVD platform. For example, the DVD Copy Control Association re-
quired CSS licenses to implement DVD drives that respected a regional encoding 
scheme.23 Pick a recent DVD and shop for it first at Amazon.com and then at Amazon’s 
United Kingdom site, www.amazon.co.uk. The U.S. website sells DVDs with region 1 
encoding (for the U.S. and Canada) while the UK website sells region 2 DVDs (Europe, 
Japan, South Africa and the Middle East, including Egypt according to Amazon). 
So far this sounds like a series of use controls perhaps directed at making price dis-
crimination possible, as more surfing at Amazon suggests that UK DVDs are more ex-
pensive than those in the U.S. But more is stake than just price discrimination. Dates of 
movie theater releases very across countries. Part of this is presumably related to the in-
ability of stars and directors to be in Paris and Los Angeles at the same time. If stars are 
important for launching a movie, you will want to open the movie on different dates in 
different countries. 
But note what that means for the release of the DVD. If the right delay window is 
three months—release the DVD three months after the theatrical run has ended—the 
DVDs will need to be released in a staggered fashion as well. But if all DVDs play any-
where, the staggering doesn’t work. Regional encoding makes that possible, and, as we 
have seen, the need to license CSS provides a lever to enforce regional encoding in DVD 
players. 
But as if this were not enough complexity, there is more at stake. The DVD standard 
is based on more than a hundred patents. Royalties on those patents are recovered 
through the sale of DVD disks and players. Many of those patents are in the two main 
                                                 
22 For background, see http://www.dvdcca.org/css/. 
23 http://www.dvdcca.org/rpc.html. 
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DVD patent pools, the 6C pool24—originally comprised of patents from six companies 
and now with nine participants—and a second pool involving patents from Philips, Sony 
and Pioneer.25 
Patent pools have a long history.26 One of the key virtues of patent pools is to reduce 
the transactions costs associated with licensing required technology. With a 100+ patents 
implicated in DVDs, individual negotiations for the right to use those patents could be 
horrifically time-consuming, plus a licensor would fear the hold-out problem, where the 
holder of the last needed patent seeks a disproportionate payment. The patent pool re-
duces both of those costs. 
How will the pools collect royalties? Toshiba was to act as the administrator for the 
6C pool and would initially charge royalties of $.075 per DVD disc and 4% of the net 
sales price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum of $4.00 per player or 
decoder.27 
The closed system makes it possible to obtain royalties on both the player and the 
discs. We are now talking about how to run a tax system. If we are going to collect royal-
ties on the patents, should we collect them on just the players? Just the discs? On both? 
There is conventional economic theory—Ramsey pricing—which attempts to provide a 
guide on that, but the bottom line is that we shouldn’t just assume that we—society, not 
the patent holders—are necessarily better off if we force the patent holders to open the 
system and just charge royalties on the players. DRM is the lock that makes this closed 
system possible. 
D. DRM and Shaping Competition 
The Apple iPod and iTunes have emerged as the leading wave of the move to online, 
digital entertainment. The iPod has led to a huge run-up in Apple’s stock price28 and the 
iPod is so successful that it now defines its own economic ecosystem with a large market 
                                                 
24 http://www.dvd6cla.com/. 
25 http://www.licensing.philips.com/information/dvd/documents206.html. 
26 See Floyd L. Vaughan, The United States Patent System (Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1956). 
27 See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General to Carey R. Ramos, June 10, 1999, text at footnotes 
32 and 33 (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm).  
28 John Authers, Ipod provides Apple with a record breaking run, Financial Times, December 30, 2005. 
Picker Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management 17 
 
in add-on devices. And indeed, Apple is profiting from these sales, often obtaining 10% 
of the wholesale price of a product.29 
An empty iPod isn’t very interesting. How do you get content into the iPod? The iPod 
plays MP3 content. That means that you can take a music CD, rip those files into MP3 
files and move the content to the iPod. I use a text-to-speech program to listen to text 
files on my iPod nano, and those files are written in MP3. Note that none of this content 
is sold particularly for the iPod and none of it is subject to DRM. This is all content that 
could easily be moved around p2p networks. 
iTunes—and, here is the key point, only iTunes—sells online content for the iPod. 
This content is encoded in the AAC format (Advance Audio Coding) and is wrapped in 
Apple’s FairPlay DRM scheme. Apple has refused to open the iPod to other sellers, such 
as by licensing FairPlay to them. Indeed, when RealNetworks figured out a way around 
the DRM limitation so that it could sell online music for iPods, Apple intimated that 
RealNetworks might have violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or engaged in 
contractually-barred reverse engineering. In any event, Apple updated the iPod soft-
ware—not just for new iPods but for all existing iPods—and reestablished incompatibil-
ity.30 
Systems competition is complicated, so it would be a mistake to assume that Apple 
has acted in a way that should trouble us or that should be found to violate U.S. antitrust 
law. But the inherent difficulty of regulating systems competition means we are likely to 
see a variety of policy responses to this particular use of DRM. France appears that it will 
be an early mover in forcing greater interoperability for the iPod and iTunes.31 
                                                 
29 Ina Fried, Apple seeks ‘tax’ on iPod accessories, cnet news.com, March 16, 2005. 
30 For discussion of the formatting, see the Berkman Center for Internet & Society, iTunes: How Copyright, Con-
tract and Technology Shape the Business of Digital Media: A Case Study, p11; for discussion of RealNetworks, see 
John Borland, RealNetworks breaks Apple’s hold on iPod, cnet news.com, July 26, 2004; John Borland, Apple fights 
RealNetworks’ ‘hacker tactics,’ cnet news.com, December 14, 2004. 
31 Nick Wingfield, Apple Blasts French Move to Force Opening of iTunes, The Wall Street Journal, March 23, 
2006, p. B6. 
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III. Identity-Based DRM Online: Switching from Products to Services 
Return to the hypo at the beginning of the paper. Buy a CD, slide it into your computer 
for ripping, and up pops a registration window. After registering with a credit card, you 
have full access to the content and that content is tagged with your identity. Share the 
content on a peer-to-peer network and you share your identity, including account infor-
mation allowing future purchases, with the world. 
As Section I of the paper should make clear, it will be very hard to implement this 
with CDs. The core problem with add-on DRM is that the CD content needs to be avail-
able in the clear to standard CD players. Consumers will have every incentive to elide 
pop up windows requiring registration. But this is the standard method of doing business 
for online content services: create an account first, with credit card and other ID informa-
tion, and buy second. Identity-based DRM is possible and the only question is how we 
will implement it. 
Focus on the choices that we need to make. One choice is local storage (download-
ing) vs. remote storage (streaming). That choice will take into account the relative costs 
of storage and bandwidth. A download model means that the content is delivered once 
and is stored on the central server and on each consumer’s computer. A streaming model 
means that bandwidth is used each time the content is used. Listen to the song once, use 
bandwidth; listen to it 100 times, use 100 times the bandwidth. 
Another question is frequency of validation. A streaming model presumably does 
one-to-one validation, meaning that your right to use the song is confirmed with each use. 
It would be difficult to give you access to the song without knowing who you were. Note 
of course that validation doesn’t mean that we can tell that you are you: it just means that 
the remote computer seeking to access the song is presenting authentication information 
that matches with the access rights to the content. 
In a downloading model, validation is a choice. An online seller could require valida-
tion each time the downloaded content is used. For example, for some content, Google 
Video downloads the content to the consumer’s computer but still confirms that access is 
allowed with each use. In contrast, Apple’s iTunes contemplates that content will be 
downloaded to a computer and then loaded on an iPod. The iPod cannot make contact to 
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the Internet on its own—it isn’t a networked device—and so content is used without vali-
dation. 
We can start to see the stresses in this system. Per-use validation of the sort seen in 
Google Video limits use of the content to networked devices, meaning no video iPod. 
Per-use validation will raise privacy issues,32 but per-use validation means that the person 
using the content has to have access to the account information. Access and identity 
travel together. In contrast, if content can be downloaded and used without validation—
meaning without use of the account information—then we quickly come back to the 
world of locked-down DRM. This isn’t music CDs where it will be hard to get consumers 
to implement the DRM in the first place. But it does mean that if the consumer can strip 
off the DRM, the content will move into the clear and can be used by anyone, even some-
one without the account information. 
But, you should say, haven’t we just changed the amount of stripping that needs to be 
done? If content from iTunes comes with DRM designed to prevent p2p distribution and 
content from Google Video comes with DRM designed to require per-use validation, 
don’t we still face the core problem that professional DRM breakers will strip both of 
these? That will unwrap the content from the DRM and allow it to enter p2p networks 
free of the DRM restrictions. 
That is why we need to switch approaches by embedding identity with the content. 
Content producers want to raise the cost of uploading content to p2p networks. That have 
tried to do that with locked-down DRM and have largely failed and they have tried to 
raise costs through lawsuits. But we should instead try to harness the incentives of the 
content purchasers. We should want to make them as careful with content as they would 
be with their own identities. 
Switch to identity-base DRM with incentives. Recall the idea: content is tagged with 
a version of my identity and a bounty. Turn in the bounty, collect a reward. The point 
isn’t that this information couldn’t be stripped by the dedicated decryptor but rather that 
the content purchaser should fear that the decryptor will not have the incentive to remove 
                                                 
32 Ed Felten, Google Video and Privacy, January 20, 2006 (available at http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=956). 
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bounty but will instead use it. Plant fear, uncertainty and doubt—introduce suspicion into 
p2p networks—and see what happens. Mistrust-based DRM would change the incentives 
to upload and share with strangers. You might be perfectly happy to give copies of songs 
tagged with the bounty ID to family members and close friends, but almost certainly not 
the strangers. 
Here is where the ID bounty model makes a difference I think. With locked-down 
DRM, the content purchaser and the computer hacker have symmetric interests in want-
ing to see the encryption scheme broken. The DRM scheme limits uses that the consumer 
might wish to make. Remove the restrictions and the consumer can do more and, if at the 
same time that means that the song is available throughout the world on a peer-to-peer 
network, who cares? 
In contrast, with ID-bounty DRM, the interests of the CD purchaser and those of the 
professional decryptor and the peers in the p2p network may diverge. The CD purchaser 
may not be confident that a decryptor will want to be as careful with the bounty as the 
purchaser would be. The uncertainty about whether the bounty has been stripped from the 
file might introduce a substantial cost to uploading. We have all learned that when we 
delete a file on our computer it’s really still there; actually removing it is much more 
work. In similar fashion, professional decryption software might leave a residue of the 
bounty which another smart professional decryptor might recover and collect on. 
With this as the framework, turn to consider how three online content providers are 
operating: Google Video, Amazon Upgrade and Apple’s iTunes. 
A. Google Video 
Go to Google Video (video.google.com) and look around. Thought that Super Bowl XL 
was dull? Maybe you would prefer to watch the commercials instead. Google Video has 
them, including the dreadful Burger King Whopperettes; the official version of the ap-
proved GoDaddy.com ad (it took them fourteen tries to get past the censors, and Google 
Video has four of the rejects); and my personal favorite, Richard Dean Anderson repris-
ing his role as MacGyver for debit MasterCard, where he buys a bunch of miscellaneous 
household junk, including a $4 tube sock, which he uses to escape from his evil captors. 
(Lest there be confusion: as the ad tells us: “Dramatization. Do not attempt.”) 
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The commercials are free, but Google Video is also in the business of selling con-
tent—mainstream professional content, such as sporting events, as well as standard TV 
content both old—I Love Lucy and The Brady Bunch—and new, including CSI and Sur-
vivor Panamá. And unlike iTunes with its one-price-fits-all policy, prices at Google 
Video move around. Single episodes of television shows are $1.99, just like at iTunes. 
But if you want to see Kobe Bryant knock down 81 points against the Toronto Raptors, it 
will set you back $3.95. Charlie Rose is a comparative bargain: almost a full hour of cur-
rent TV for $0.99. 
Google Video shows an acceptable but low-quality brief preview of the show along-
side a chance to buy the higher-quality full version. Enter the usual credit card informa-
tion—Google stores this for future purchases—and before you know it you are 
downloading. My first download was of an episode of Star Trek Voyager in which Cap-
tain Janeway and the crew find Amelia Earhart (her plane wasn’t lost in 1937; she was 
abducted by aliens and put into cryostasis for 400 years, obviously). 
Downloading what exactly? You initially see a downloaded video file of 708 bytes, 
but, assuming that you didn’t select streaming, Google eventually stores the entire video 
file on your hard drive (177 megabytes for Voyager). You playback the download in 
Google’s Video Player. You can try to open the file in the Windows Media Player, but it 
can’t decode it. Google’s FAQ notes that downloaded videos must be played in the 
Google Video player because some of the videos are copy-protected. 
Files in hand—both the small files and the large content files—what can you do? 
That seems to depend on the settings of the file. The Voyager file is more controlled. 
When you click on it to see what happens—either the small file or the video contents file 
itself—you see a series of messages in the Google video player: connecting and creating 
the video file, buffering, determining file ownership, authenticating. If you have not 
stored a Google account cookie on your computer, you will be asked to log on to your 
Google account. If you have a cookie, Google will use the cookie to confirm your right to 
play the file. Either way, you need to establish a live Internet connection to play the 
video.33 This means no video iPod. In contrast, you seem to establish rights to Charlie 
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Rose once—single validation rather than per-use validation. You can watch it again if 
you must without being connected to the Internet. 
What does that mean for file sharing? The small video files don’t bring the content 
with them. If you move a small file to another computer and click on the file there, it will 
seek to make contact with the Google mothership. The file seems to remember your 
gmail address, but you have to insert your password. As to the video files, the Charlie 
Rose file plays in full without contact or a password (though in a degraded form, but that 
may been a result of burning the file to a CD and moving that file physically to a second 
computer). The Voyager video file phones home and needs password access to the ac-
count before playing. 
This is one version of identity-based DRM, in many ways, a natural, conservative 
implementation of identity-based DRM. Absent the ability to strip the DRM from the 
downloaded file, anyone using the file needs access to the password to the Google ac-
count. But the downloaded video files are a natural target for unwrapping, and the pur-
chaser of the file has no reason not to share the files with others. If the files came with 
access to the Google account—email and password—the file downloader would have a 
much stronger incentive to not share the file. 
B. Amazon Upgrade 
Switch from video to text, and, in particular, the digitized book market. Google Book 
Search has received most of the attention—in the market and in the courts—but Amazon 
has announced two interesting programs: Amazon Pages and Amazon Upgrade.34 Pages 
is a pay-per-page model. Want to read only the juicy parts of the latest tell-all? You could 
go to the bookstore and stand there flipping through the book with a clerk looking over 
your shoulder, but now, with Pages you can go legit: you can just search for “Monica 
Lewinsky,” pay for the two pages you really want to see and be done with it. 
Amazon Upgrade is something else entirely: digital access to books purchased 
through Amazon. This is a really clever move by Amazon. They are changing the basic 
scope of the book business and this will put even more pressure on independent book 
                                                 
34 See Amazon’s Press Release of November 3, 2005 (available at http://phx.corporate-
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sellers and even large operators like Barnes & Noble and Borders. And they have come 
up with a structure that should put meaningful limits on the sharing of digital texts. 
Many readers—including me—want it both ways: the joy of reading books on paper 
and the search capability of books online. If I am actually going to take the time to read 
the whole book, I want to be able to maximize my use of it. A paper copy and a search-
able digital copy will do just that. Amazon Upgrade does just that. The details are a little 
murky, but the core idea is buy the book, get the search service. 
Buy a book from Amazon—one click shipped to you—and Amazon will sell you the 
right to search that book online at Amazon. Sell when? Just when I buy the book, as a 
bundle? Can I buy online access later? At the same price I could have paid at the time of 
purchase? Pay an annual fee and get access for all of my purchases through Amazon? 
None of that is particularly clear, and each approach might have different competitive 
consequences. 
But focus instead on copyright and digital copies. Amazon doesn’t seem to be selling 
digital offline copies with the paper copies. Instead, Amazon is selling a search service. 
Everything suggests that Amazon intends to do this with the consent of copyright hold-
ers, presumably for a split of the revenues. 
The difference between service and product is substantial. If I downloaded a copy of 
the digital book, Amazon (and the copyright holder) would have to worry about what I do 
with the copy. Do I try to make other copies? If it is wrapped in some encryption via 
DRM software, do I strip off the wrapper and put the content into the open? Again the 
darknet critique: It only takes one sophisticated person to break the encryption, and then 
the content can circulate freely. And the “size” of access required for digital text is quite 
different for that video or music. You want all of the video or music, not frames or notes 
here and there. In contrast, for digital text, a search service with access to chunks in re-
sponse to search terms might suffice. 
The service model limits that possibility considerably. Presumably, I will need to log 
on to Amazon as me to use the digital books that I have “purchased.” For me to share my 
access with anyone else, I will have to give them full access to my Amazon account. I 
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will probably do that with family members, and maybe a friend or two, but I won’t do it 
with my 10,000 closest friends halfway around the world. 
That was Napster and Grokster, but the service model gives me a strong incentive to 
control access to the copy. By linking access to the digital object to access to other attrib-
utes that I care about—my account information and the ability to ship books via one-click 
around the globe—the service model turns me into an honest trading partner. I don’t have 
that same strong incentive with a digital book product. 
C. iTunes 
iTunes, a separate download available on Apple’s website, is the key software for the 
iPod universe.35 It is the software interface to the iPod through which content is put on 
the iPod. iTunes is also an online content store, originally music and now music and 
video. Let’s go shopping. As I open the iTunes Music Store, I see at the top a list of fea-
tured albums. Click on one—Unwritten by Natasha Bedingfield—and iTunes switches to 
a new window. We see the album cover, basic release info (an album with 14 songs re-
leased on August 2, 2005), and a series of buttons—“Gift This Music,” “Artist Alert,” 
and “Tell a friend”—plus, most importantly, a button to buy the album for $9.99. But 
iTunes also sells each of the separate 14 tracks as singles for 99 cents each. Want just the 
title track? Click, pay—though previously provided account info—and download and 
you “own” the Unwritten single that you just made. 
As good shoppers, we should comparison shop at Amazon. A search on music on 
“unwritten Natasha Bedingfield” pulls up 14 items, plus sponsored links for ringtones. It 
isn’t immediately obvious what the 14 different items are, but two jump out at you. The 
last one on the list is the Sony XCP copy-protected version of the CD, listed as currently 
unavailable. The first one looks like the album cover that we saw at iTunes, so click 
there. And that version is the August 2, 2005 release, 13 tracks, for a price of $12.98, 
marked down $6.01 from the list price of $18.98. Amazon also offers a link to used ver-
sions of the CD, starting at a low price of $7.99. (A bit of a mystery: Amazon lists 13 
tracks, iTunes 14 with the fourteenth being a song listed as a hidden track.) 
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Two points should jump out immediately. First, online delivery changes the cost 
structure of delivering content. No CDs, no jewel boxes, no stacks of inventory sitting 
around. Although estimates of savings differ, many believe that the drop in the costs of 
delivering content are substantial. The prices reflect this: $9.99 at iTunes vs. $12.98 at 
Amazon, plus shipping. Second, we can unbundle the album and sell songs song by song. 
This allows consumers to choose only the songs that they want. Even when singles were 
popular, only a limited number of singles were produced. Now on iTunes, every album 
brings with it its own singles. That gives rise to some tricky pricing issues, but I won’t 
explore those here (so what price would you need to set for the singles such that the an-
ticipated revenue sales for the album and the singles is not less than would have been 
earned had the album been sold only bundled). Unbundling also means that songs can be 
released faster and an artist need not wait until 14 songs have been amassed to release 
any one of them. 
iTunes also sells video for playback on the video iPod or on a computer. For video, 
single items sell for a $1.99 be it a 21-minute episode of NBC’s Scrubs, 43 minutes of 
Desperate Housewives or a 4-minute Pixar short. iTunes also sells a season pass to a par-
ticular show—good for all episodes of a particular season—for $34.99. There is a lot that 
is strategically interesting about the video on iTunes and we should examine that briefly 
to understand what is at stake for digital rights management on iTunes. 
Start with cable bypass. The over-the-air broadcast networks would love to restore a 
direct relationship with their viewers. Right now, between cable TV and satellite, roughly 
85% of U.S. viewers receive broadcast TV through an intermediary. Cable bypass means 
that the broadcasters have figured out a way to cut out the cable and satellite companies. 
iTunes is one path to bypass, though, of course, serious use of iTunes means a broadband 
connection, and for now at least, broadband comes from the cable company or as DSL 
from the local phone company. 
For premium cable networks, online video makes it possible to unbundle the channel 
and make it easy for viewers to sample hot premium cable shows. Showtime is making 
some of its content available on iTunes. Premium cable channels are typically purchased 
by the month, and you pay a flat amount regardless of how many shows you want. On 
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iTunes, if you just want to watch Kirstie Alley in Fat Actress, you can buy it episode by 
episode. 
The irony is that while the Federal Communications Commission has been pushing 
cable networks to create family-friendly cable tiers or else36—the else is mandatory a la 
carte pricing—per-show pricing has come to iTunes. iTunes sells content from both the 
Disney Channel and MTV, but you can spend your money on Disney and never spend a 
dime on MTV. 
We should now head inside iTunes and consider briefly how Apple has approached 
DRM.37 Apple’s DRM is called “FairPlay” and it is identity-based. Purchased songs can 
be copied to an unlimited number of computers, but only five computers at a time can 
play the songs. This is unlimited copying, limited use, and is implemented through an 
authorization process which amounts to assigning an identity to particular computers. 
Authorization is simple: “To authorize a computer, simply play a purchased song on your 
computer. The first time you authorize your computer, you’ll need to enter your iTunes 
account name and password.”38 So the songs are freely sharable, but only someone with 
access to your account information can actually play the songs, and you can only author-
ize five computers. Again, like Google Video, a content purchaser isn’t affirmatively dis-
couraged from sharing the content—there is no DRM bounty—so songs can be shared 
and subject to unwrapping by clever decryptors. 
IV. Conclusion 
The powerful shift in copying technology over the last thirty years has destabilized how 
we produce copies and the economic arrangements associated with prior technologies. 
These technological changes have created a broad shift in the ability to make copies mov-
ing control away from producers towards consumers. As a consequence, these technolo-
                                                 
36 See FCC Press Release, December 12, 2005, Chairman Kevin J. Martin’s Statement on the Announcement 
That Cable Companies May Voluntarily Offer Family Tiers (available at  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-262676A1.pdf).  
37 For background, see Berkman Center for Internet & Society, iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and Technol-
ogy Shape the Business of Digital Media—A Case Study (available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/media/itunes). 
38 http://www.apple.com/support/itunes/musicstore/authorization/.  
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gies have altered the practical enforceability of the rights that law assigns to copyright 
owners. 
Digital rights management technologies are an effort to make meaningful the legal 
rights of copyright owners. DRM faces severe obstacles. For preexisting products like the 
music CD, it has proven to be very difficult to add DRM after the fact. CDs need to work 
in standard CD players, and the limits DRM. The firestorm over Sony BMG’s effort to 
produce CDs subject to DRM suggests that we are unlikely to see meaningful DRM for 
music CDs soon. 
But we are switching how we deliver content from products to services. Music CDs 
and eventually DVDs will be replaced by online services such as Apple’s iTunes and 
Google Video. Both of these come with DRM built-in and both rely on identity-based 
DRM. Identity-based DRM ties identity to content. Content can be shared widely, but 
absent access to identity, the content is worthless. 
This is a substantial step forward for DRM, but may still be a step short of where we 
need to be. Content purchasers still have no reason to protect purchased content. Identity-
based DRM coupled with bounty tags will create an incentives wedge between content 
purchasers and stripping/p2p software and with peers in a p2p network. We should want 
a system where content purchasers are as careful with content as they would be with 
identity and mistrust-based DRM may be that system. 
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